Johnson v. California (2005)

Johnson v. California (2005)

543 U.S. 499

The California Department of Corrections (CDC) maintained an unwritten policy of racially segregating male prisoners in double cells for up to sixty days each time they entered a correctional facility as a new prisoner or a transferee. The CDC asserted that the policy was necessary to prevent violence caused by racial gangs. Garrison Johnson, an African American prisoner who had been double-celled with another African American inmate under the policy, filed suit in U.S. District Court against state officials alleging that the policy violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the state, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It argued that the constitutionality of California’s policy’s ought not to be reviewed under strict scrutiny but rather under the deferential standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley (1987), a case that involved restrictions on prisoners’ correspondence and right to marry, and it concluded, based on its application of the Turner standard, that the state’s policy easily passed constitutional muster. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Opinion of the Court: O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer.

Concurring opinion: Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer.

Dissenting opinions: Stevens; Thomas, Scalia.

Not participating: Rehnquist.

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

CDC institutions house all new male inmates and all male inmates transferred from other state facilities in reception centers for up to 60 days upon their arrival. During that time, prison officials evaluate the inmates to determine their ultimate placement. Double-cell assignments in the reception centers are based on a number of factors, predominantly race. In fact, the CDC has admitted that the chances of an inmate being assigned a cellmate of another race are “‘[p]retty close”‘ to zero percent. The CDC further subdivides prisoners within each racial group. Thus, Japanese-Americans are housed separately from Chinese-Americans, and Northern California Hispanics are separated from Southern California Hispanics.

The CDC’s asserted rationale for this practice is that it is necessary to prevent violence caused by racial gangs. It cites numerous incidents of racial violence in CDC facilities and identifies five major prison gangs in the State: Mexican Mafia, Nuestra Familia, Black Guerilla Family, Aryan Brotherhood, and Nazi Low Riders. The CDC also notes that prison-gang culture is violent and murderous. An associate warden testified that if race were not considered in making initial housing assignments, she is certain there would be racial conflict in the cells and in the yard. . . . The CDC claims that it must therefore segregate all inmates while it determines whether they pose a danger to others.

With the exception of the double cells in reception areas, the rest of the state prison facilities—dining areas, yards, and cells—are fully integrated. After the initial 60-day period, prisoners are allowed to choose their own cellmates. The CDC usually grants inmate requests to be housed together, unless there are security reasons for denying them. . . . 

We have held that “all racial classifications [imposed by government] . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995). Under strict scrutiny, the government has the burden of proving that racial classifications “are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.” We have insisted on strict scrutiny in every context, even for so-called “benign” racial classifications, such as race-conscious university admissions policies, see Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), race-based preferences in government contracts, see Adarand, and race-based districting intended to improve minority representation, see Shaw v. Reno (1993).

The reasons for strict scrutiny are familiar. Racial classifications raise special fears that they are motivated by an invidious purpose. Thus, we have admonished time and again that, “[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining . . . what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.” We therefore apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifications to ‘”smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”

The CDC claims that its policy should be exempt from our categorical rule because it is “neutral”—that is, it “neither benefits nor burdens one group or individual more than any other group or individual.” In other words, strict scrutiny should not apply because all prisoners are “equally” segregated. The CDC’s argument ignores our repeated command that “racial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they may be said to burden or benefit the races equally.” Indeed, we rejected the notion that separate can ever be equal—or “neutral”—50 years ago in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), and we refuse to resurrect it today. . . . 

The need for strict scrutiny is no less important here, where prison officials cite racial violence as the reason for their policy. As we have recognized in the past, racial classifications “threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility.” Indeed, by insisting that inmates be housed only with other inmates of the same race, it is possible that prison officials will breed further hostility among prisoners and reinforce racial and ethnic divisions. By perpetuating the notion that race matters most, racial segregation of inmates “may exacerbate the very patterns of [violence that it is] said to counteract.”

 . . . The CDC invites us to make an exception to the rule that strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications, and instead to apply the deferential standard of review articulated in Turner v. Safley (1987), because its segregation policy applies only in the prison context. We decline the invitation. In Turner, we considered a claim by Missouri prisoners that regulations restricting inmate marriages and inmate-to-inmate correspondence were unconstitutional. We rejected the prisoners’ argument that the regulations should be subject to strict scrutiny, asking instead whether the regulation that burdened the prisoners’ fundamental rights was “reasonably related” to “legitimate penological interests.” We have never applied Turner to racial classifications. . . . We have applied Turner‘s reasonable-relationship test only to rights that are “inconsistent with proper incarceration.” This is because certain privileges and rights must necessarily be limited in the prison context. Thus, for example, we have relied on Turner in addressing First Amendment challenges to prison regulations, including restrictions on freedom of association, limits on inmate correspondence, restrictions on inmates’ access to courts, restrictions on receipt of subscription publications, and work rules limiting prisoners’ attendance at religious services. We have also applied Turner to some due process claims, such as involuntary medication of mentally ill prisoners and restrictions on the right to marry.

The right not to be discriminated against based on one’s race is not susceptible to the logic of Turner. It is not a right that need necessarily be compromised for the sake of proper prison administration. On the contrary, compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination is not only consistent with proper prison administration, but also bolsters the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system. Race discrimination is “especially pernicious in the administration of justice.” And public respect for our system of justice is undermined when the system discriminates based on race. When government officials are permitted to use race as a proxy for gang membership and violence without demonstrating a compelling government interest and proving that their means are narrowly tailored, society as a whole suffers. . . . 

The CDC argues that “[d]eference to the particular expertise of prison officials in the difficult task of managing daily prison operations” requires a more relaxed standard of review for its segregation policy. But we have refused to defer to state officials’ judgments on race in other areas where those officials traditionally exercise substantial discretion. For example, we have held that, despite the broad discretion given to prosecutors when they use their peremptory challenges, using those challenges to strike jurors on the basis of their race is impermissible. Similarly, in the redistricting context, despite the traditional deference given to States when they design their electoral districts, we have subjected redistricting plans to strict scrutiny when States draw district lines based predominantly on race. Compare generally Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004) (partisan gerrymandering) with Shaw v. Reno (1993) (racial gerrymandering). . . . 

The CDC protests that strict scrutiny will handcuff prison administrators and render them unable to address legitimate problems of race­based violence in prisons. Not so. Strict scrutiny is not “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.” Strict scrutiny does not preclude the ability of prison officials to address the compelling interest in prison safety. Prison administrators, however, will have to demonstrate that any race-based policies are narrowly tailored to that end. . . . 

The fact that strict scrutiny applies “says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that determination is the job of the court applying strict scrutiny.” At this juncture, no such determination has been made. On remand, the CDC will have the burden of demonstrating that its policy is narrowly tailored with regard to new inmates as well as transferees. Prisons are dangerous places, and the special circumstances they present may justify racial classifications in some contexts. Such circumstances can be considered in applying strict scrutiny, which is designed to take relevant differences into account.

We do not decide whether the CDC’s policy violates the Equal Protection Clause. We hold only that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review and remand the case to allow the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, or the District Court, to apply it in the first instance. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER and JUSTICE BREYER join, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion, subject to the reservation [I] expressed in Grutter v. Bollinger, (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

Disagreeing with the Court that “strict scrutiny” properly applies to any and all racial classifications, but agreeing that the stereotypical classification at hand warrants rigorous scrutiny, I join the Court’s opinion.

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

 . . . [T]he CDC [has not] made any offer of proof to suggest that a remand for further factual development would serve any purpose other than to postpone the inevitable. I therefore agree with the submission of the United States as amicus curiae that the Court should hold the policy unconstitutional on the current record.

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, dissenting.

The questions presented in this case require us to resolve two conflicting lines of precedent. On the one hand, as the Court stresses, this Court has said that ‘”all racial classifications reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized.”‘ On the other, this Court has no less categorically said that “the [relaxed] standard of review we adopted in Turner applies to all circumstances in which the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights.”

Emphasizing the former line of cases, the majority resolves the conflict in favor of strict scrutiny. I disagree. The Constitution has always demanded less within the prison walls. Time and again, even when faced with constitutional rights no less “fundamental” than the right to be free from state-sponsored racial discrimination, we have deferred to the reasonable judgments of officials experienced in running this Nation’s prisons. There is good reason for such deference in this case. California oversees roughly 160,000 inmates, in prisons that have been a breeding ground for some of the most violent prison gangs in America—all of them organized along racial lines. In that atmosphere, California racially segregates a portion of its inmates, in a part of its prisons, for brief periods of up to 60 days, until the State can arrange permanent housing. The majority is concerned with sparing inmates the indignity and stigma of racial discrimination. California is concerned with their safety and saving their lives. I respectfully dissent. . . . 

The CDC houses [reception-center] prisoners in double cells during the [initial] 60-day period. In pairing cellmates, race is indisputably the predominant factor. California’s reason is simple: Its prisons are dominated by violent gangs. And as the largest gangs’ names indicate—the Aryan Brotherhood, the Black Guerrilla Family, the Mexican Mafia, the Nazi Low Riders, and La Nuestra Familia—they are organized along racial lines.

According to the State, housing inmates in double cells without regard to race threatens not only prison discipline, but also the physical safety of inmates and staff. That is because double cells are especially dangerous. The risk of racial violence in public areas of prisons is high, and the tightly confined, private conditions of cells hazard even more violence. Prison staff cannot see into the cells without going up to them, and inmates can cover the windows to prevent the staff from seeing inside the cells. The risk of violence caused by this privacy is grave, for inmates are confined to their cells for much of the day.

Nevertheless, while race is the predominant factor in pairing cellmates, it is hardly the only one. After dividing this subset of inmates based on race, the CDC further divides them based on geographic or national origin. As an example, Hispanics from Northern and Southern California are not housed together in reception centers, because they often belong to rival gangs-La Nuestra Familia and the Mexican Mafia, respectively. Likewise, Chinese and Japanese inmates are not housed together, nor are Cambodians, Filipinos, Laotians, or Vietnamese. In addition to geographic and national origin, prison officials consider a host of other factors, including inmates’ age, mental health, medical needs, criminal history, and gang affiliation. For instance, when Johnson was admitted in 1987, he was a member of the Crips, a black street gang. He was therefore ineligible to be housed with nonblack inmates. . . . 

Traditionally, federal courts rarely involved themselves in the administration of state prisons, adopting a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administration. . . . [T]his Court [has] recognized that the extension of the Constitution’s demands behind prison walls had to accommodate the needs of prison administration. This Court reached that accommodation in Turner v. Safley. That standard should govern Johnson’s claims, as it has governed a host of other claims challenging conditions of confinement, even when restricting the rights at issue would otherwise have occasioned strict scrutiny. Under the Turner standard, the CDC’s policy passes constitutional muster, because it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. . . . 

 . . . Johnson’s claims, even more than other claims to which we have applied Turner‘s test, implicate Turner‘s rationale. In fact, in a passage that bears repeating, the Turner Court explained precisely why deference to the judgments of California’s prison officials is necessary:

Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration. The rule would also distort the decision-making process, for every administrative judgment would be subject to the possibility that some court somewhere would conclude that it had a less restrictive way of solving the problem at hand. Courts inevitably would become the primary arbiters of what constitutes the best solution to every administrative problem, thereby unnecessarily perpetuating the involvement of the federal courts in affairs of prison administration.

The majority’s failure to heed that advice is inexplicable, especially since Turner itself recognized the “growing problem with prison gangs.”

 . . . The dangers California seeks to prevent are real. Controlling prison gangs is the central challenge facing correctional officers and administrators. The worst gangs are highly regimented and sophisticated organizations that commit crimes ranging from drug trafficking to theft and murder. And with gang membership on the rise, the percentage of prisoners affiliated with prison gangs more than doubled in the 1990s. The problem of prison gangs is not unique to California, but California has a history like no other. . . . California has the largest number of gang-related inmates of any correctional system in the country, including the Federal Government. . . . 

It is against this backdrop of pervasive racial violence that California racially segregates inmates in the reception centers’ double cells, for brief periods of up to 60 days, until such time as the State can assign permanent housing. Viewed in that context and in light of the four factors enunciated in Turner, California’s policy is constitutional: The CDC’s policy is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest; alternative means of exercising the restricted right remain open to inmates; racially integrating double cells might negatively impact prison inmates, staff, and administrators; and there are no obvious, easy alternatives to the CDC’s policy. . . . 

The majority’s test eviscerates Turner. Inquiring whether a given right is consistent with “proper prison administration” calls for precisely the sort of judgments that Turner said courts were ill equipped to make. In none of the cases in which the Court deferred to the judgments of prison officials under Turner did it examine whether “proper” prison security and discipline permitted greater speech or associational rights; expanded access to the courts; broader freedom from bodily restraint; or additional free exercise rights. The Court has steadfastly refused to undertake the threshold standard-of-review inquiry that Turner settled, and that the majority today resurrects. And with good reason: As Turner pointed out, these judgments are better left in the first instance to the officials who run our Nation’s prisons, not to the judges who run its courts.

In place of the Court’s usual deference, the majority gives conclusive force to its own guesswork about “proper” prison administration. It hypothesizes that California’s policy might incite, rather than diminish, racial hostility. The majority’s speculations are implausible. . . . [Its] guesswork falls far short of the compelling showing needed to overcome the deference we owe to prison administrators.

The majority contends that the Court “[has] put the burden on state actors to demonstrate that their race-based policies are justified” and “[has] refused to defer to state officials’ judgments on race in other areas where those officials traditionally exercise substantial discretion.” Yet two Terms ago, in upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative-action program, this Court deferred to the judgment by the law school’s faculty and administrators on their need for diversity in the student body. See Grutter: (“The Law School’s educational judgment that . . . diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.”). Deference would seem all the more warranted in the prison context, for whatever the Court knows of administering educational institutions, it knows much less about administering penal ones. The potential consequences of second-guessing the judgments of prison administrators are also much more severe. . . . 

Moreover, the majority’s decision subjects prison officials to competing and perhaps conflicting demands. In this case, California prison officials have uniformly averred that random double-celling poses a substantial risk of serious harm to the celled inmates. If California assigned inmates to double cells without regard to race, knowing full well that violence might result, that would seem the very definition of deliberate indifference. Nor would a victimized inmate need to prove that prison officials had anticipated any particular attack; it would be sufficient that prison officials had ignored a dangerous condition that was chronic and ongoing—like interracial housing in closely confined quarters within prisons dominated by racial gangs. Under [our previous decision in] Farmer [v. Brennan (1994)], prison officials could have been ordered to take account of the very thing to which they may now have to turn a blind eye: inmates’ race. . . . 

Petitioner Garrison Johnson challenges not permanent, but temporary, segregation of only a portion of California’s prisons. Of the 17 years Johnson has been incarcerated, California has assigned him a cellmate of the same race for no more than a year (and probably more like four months); Johnson has had black cellmates during the other 16 years, but by his own choice. Nothing in the record demonstrates that if Johnson (or any other prisoner) requested to be housed with a person of a different race, it would be denied (though Johnson’s gang affiliation with the Crips might stand in his way). Moreover, Johnson concedes that California’s prisons are racially violent places, and that he lives in fear of being attacked because of his race. Perhaps on remand the CDC’s policy will survive strict scrutiny, but in the event that it does not, Johnson may well have won a Pyrrhic victory.