Paul v. Davis (1976)
Paul v. Davis (1976)
424 U.S. 693
A photograph of Edward C. Davis Ill bearing his name was included in a flyer of “active shoplifters” after he was arrested on a shoplifting charge in Louisville, Kentucky. When the charge subsequently was dismissed, Davis brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Edgar Paul, chief of police of Louisville, and other petitioners who had distributed the flyer to area merchants, alleging that their action under color of law had deprived him of his constitutional rights. Specifically, he alleged that distribution of the flyer had deprived him of his constitutional right to privacy and of liberty and property rights secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted petitioners’ motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed on due process grounds, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Presented here is that portion of the Supreme Court’s decision pertaining to the question of Davis’s claim of a violation of the right to privacy.
Opinion of the Court: Rehnquist, Blackmun, Burger, Powell, Stewart.
Dissenting opinion: Brennan, Marshall, White.
Stevens did not participate.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent’s complaint also alleged a violation of a “right to privacy guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.” The Court of Appeals did not pass upon this claim since it found the allegations of a due process violation sufficient to require reversal of the District Court’s order. As we have agreed with the District Court on the due process issue, we find it necessary to pass upon respondent’s other theory in order to determine whether there is any support for the litigation he seeks to pursue.
While there is no “right of privacy” found in any specific guarantee of the Constitution, the Court has recognized that “zones of privacy” may be created by more specific constitutional guarantees and thereby impose limits upon government power.… Respondent’s case, however, comes within none of these areas. He does not seek to suppress evidence seized in the course of an unreasonable search.… And our other “right of privacy” cases, while defying categorical description, deal generally with substantive aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Roe [v. Wade (1973)] the Court pointed out that the personal rights found in this guarantee of personal privacy must be limited to those which are “fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” as described in Palko v. Connecticut… (1937). The activities detailed as being within this definition were ones very different from that for which respondent claims constitutional protection—matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education. In these areas it has been held that there are limitations on the States’ power to substantively regulate conduct.
Respondent’s claim is far afield from this line of decisions. He claims constitutional protection against the disclosure of the fact of his arrest on a shoplifting charge. His claim is based not upon any challenge to the State’s ability to restrict his freedom of action in a sphere contended to be “private,” but instead on a claim that the State may not publicize a record of an official act such as an arrest. None of our substantive privacy decisions hold this or anything like this, and we decline to enlarge them in this manner.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concurs and MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurs in part, dissenting.
I had always thought that one of this Court’s most important roles is to provide a formidable bulwark against governmental violation of the constitutional safeguards securing in our free society the legitimate expectations of every person to innate human dignity and sense of worth.
It is a regrettable abdication of that role and a saddening denigration of our majestic Bill of Rights when the Court tolerates arbitrary and capricious official conduct branding an individual as a criminal without compliance with constitutional procedures designed to ensure the fair and impartial ascertainment of criminal culpability. Today’s decision must surely be a short-lived aberration.* …
*In light of my conviction that the State may not condemn an individual as a criminal without following the mandates of the trial process, I need not address the question whether there is an independent right of privacy which would yield the same result. Indeed, privacy notions appear to be inextricably interwoven with the considerations which require that a State not single an individual out for punishment outside the judicial process. Essentially, the core concept would be that a State cannot broadcast even such factual events as the occurrence of an arrest that does not culminate in a conviction when there are no legitimate law enforcement justifications for doing so, since the State chargeable with the knowledge that many employers will treat an arrest the same as a conviction and deny the individual employment or other opportunities on the basis of a fact that has no probative value with respect to actual criminal culpability.… A host of state and federal courts, relying on both privacy notions and the presumption of innocence, have begun to develop a line of cases holding that there are substantive limits on the power of the government to disseminate unresolved arrest records outside the law enforcement system.… I fear that after today’s decision, these nascent doctrines will never have the opportunity for full growth and analysis. Since the Court of Appeals did not address respondent’s privacy claims, and since there has not been substantial briefing or oral argument on that point, the Court’s pronouncements are certainly unnecessary. Of course, States that are more sensitive than is this Court to the privacy and other interests of individuals erroneously caught up in the criminal justice system are certainly free to adopt or adhere to higher standards under state law.… Mr. Justice White does not concur in this footnote.